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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
KEITH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
SHAWN R. KEITH, ) Criminal Case No. 025501031 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Appellant Case No. 20040328-CA 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal 
in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion 
to suppress after finding that the State of Utah had not complied with the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (Utah 1953, as amended) 
and Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code? 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the issue of 
testimony of an uncertified officer regarding generation of the intoxilizer 5000 could 
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still be admissible under the Rules of Evidence with proper foundation excluding the 
requirement for operator certification. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to 
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and a standard of "clearly 
erroneous" as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 
and State v. Rhoades. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons. 
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in its 
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, f l 1 , 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96, 
P 0 , 989 P.2d 52), cert, denied. 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Whether testimony is 
admitted in violation of a defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness, see State v. Calliham, 2002 UT. 87,1J31, 57 P.3d 222. 
Ordinarily, if a case involves a mixed question of fact and law, the Court affords 
some measure of discretion to the district court's application of the law. The 
measure of discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being 
reviewed. See State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125,1J26, 63 P.3d 650. Little discretion 
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is afforded to the district court involving issues, such as the reasonableness of 
search and seizure, where there must be statewide standards that guide law 
enforcement and prosecutorial officials, see State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1J12, 78 
P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen 2002 UT. 25 at 1J26). Where issues on appeal present 
questions of statutory interpretation, the proper interpretation of the statute is a 
question of law and reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 
UT 36 fl17,977 P.2d 1201. The Court of Appeals accords no difference to the legal 
conclusions of the trial court but reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 
UT 9, P , 20 P.3d 300. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes 
the following apply: 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (Utah 1953, as amended) 
Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant entered 
a plea of "no contest" to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, a class 
A misdemeanor as contained in the information filed with the trial court. On or about 
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the 23rd day of June, 2002, Officer Dan Guyman of the Cedar City Police 
Department, while on patrol, spotted a white sport utility vehicle or "SUV" that 
appeared to be stuck in the area of 700 East 200 South in Cedar City, Iron County, 
Utah. Officer Guyman approached the vehicle and found the Appellant with his child. 
He noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from the Appellant and administered field 
sobriety tests. He then arrested the Appellant and asked him to submit to a breath 
test. Appellant registered a .157 on the Intoxilizer 5000. At the time of the test, 
Officer Guyman was not certified as an operator although he had testified at the 
administrative hearing for driver's license suspension that he was certified. 
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: In September, 2002, the 
Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence and without evidentiary hearing but 
upon stipulated facts1, the matter was argued by counsel in January, 2003, before 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Judge Eves entered his written ruling on or about the 
31st day of January, 2003. The Appellant challenged the admissibility of the test 
results of the Intoxilizer 5000 where the operator was not certified pursuant to the 
Utah Administrative Code R714-500-6. The trial court denied the motion to suppress 
finding that the State should be given the opportunity to establish the foundation for 
1
 The parties stipulated to the facts as was made clear at the State's hearing on 
the 13th of January, 2003; see the hearing transcript of that day at page 3; see also the 
record at pages 53, 66 and 167. 
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admission of the breath alcohol test results under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
stating that the same does not require that an expert be certified or licensed prior to 
being allowed to testify, certification or the lack thereof going to the weight of such 
evidence and not to its admissibility. In March, 2003, after an evidentiary hearing 
the trial court determined that the test results were admissible upon the showing that 
the Intoxilizer 5000 was operating properly. See the hearing transcript of March 10th, 
2003, at pages 62-64; see also the Record at page 168. 
In November, 2003, the Appellant entered a "no contest" plea and was 
sentenced on the 5th day of January, 2004. The judgment, sentence, stay of 
execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment was filed with the Court 
on or about the 21st day of January, 2004. The Appellant filed his notice of appeal 
on or about the 22nd of January, 2004. 
STATEMENT of FACTS 
1. On or about the 23rd day of June, 2002, Officer Dan Guyman, of the Cedar 
City Police Department was on patrol when he spotted a white SUV that appeared 
to be stuck in the area of 700 East 200 South, Cedar City, Iron County, Utah. See 
the Record at pages 53,66 and 167; see also the hearing transcript of January 23rd, 
2003, at page 3. 
2. Officer Guyman approached the vehicle and encountered the Appellant and 
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his child. Officer Guyman noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from Appellant and 
administered field sobriety tests. Id. 
3. Appellant was arrested and asked to submit to a breath test. Appellant 
registered . 157 on the Intoxilizer 5000. At the time of the test, Officer Guyman was 
not certified as an operator. However, the officer did testify untruthfully at the 
administrative hearing for driver's license suspension by stating that he was certified. 
Id. 
4. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the intoxilizer test 
results, arguing that Officer Guyman's failure to keep his certification current on the 
Intoxilizer 5000 violated the rules and procedures for such tests promulgated by the 
Utah Legislature and the Department of Pubic Safety, thereby making the results of 
such tests inadmissible at the trial of this case. See the Record at page 21. 
5. The State of Utah argued that while the results of the intoxilizer may not be 
presumed admissible under the provisions of the Utah Code, the Utah Rules of 
Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence and pursuant to those rules, the 
results of the test could be admissible if they satisfy the requirements of Rule 702. 
See the Record at page 53. 
6. On or about the 31st day of January, 2003, the trial court denied the 
Appellant's motion to suppress concluding that Section 41-6-44.3, Utah Code 
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Annotated (1953, as amended) only provided a method by which the State could 
create a presumption of the validity of a chemical test analysis and did not govern 
what was required to determine the admissibility of evidence at trial. See the Record 
at page 87; See also the hearing transcript of March 10th, 2003, at pages 62-64. 
7. On or about the 1st day of April, 2004, the trial court entered its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law ruling in favor of the State of Utah. See the Record at 
page 107. 
8. A final judgment was entered to the charge of driving under the influence 
of alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, on or about the 21st day of January, 2004, see 
the Record at page147, and Appellant's notice of appeal was filed the 23rd day of 
January, 2004, see the Record at page 149. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue involved in the motion to suppress the breath test evidence is 
preserved in the Record on Appeal and a ruling made with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The facts were stipulated although by evidentiary hearing the 
testimony received conforms for purposes of the issues on appeal. Mr. Keith later 
entered a plea and waived his right to trial pursuant to a written statement and given 
the standard oral colloquy for entry of plea under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. He did not waive his right to appeal. See the Record at page 131. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress after finding 
that the State had not complied with the requirement of the Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) and Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah 
Administrative Code. The certification and recertification process is intended to 
provide training and qualification for the proper use of breath testing devices after 
a procedure that ensures the evidence admitted and relied upon is trustworthy. 
Certification of the operator is an essential component in the regulatory scheme to 
maintain the standard of trustworthiness that was contemplated by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety in complying with Rule 714-500-6 
of the Utah Administrative Code. An additional purpose may be inferred from the 
specific and detailed requirements which project that the intent was to establish 
uniform standards and procedures statewide and not vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. The trial court viewed the question of operator certification as one not 
required for admissibility of breath test results under Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence but failed to consider the matter in its proper context pari materia or upon 
an interpretation consistent with or in harmony with the more specific statutory and 
regulatory provisions. The trial court erred in attempting to apply the Utah Court of 
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Appeals rationale in State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1998) which applied 
to an alternative basis for admissibility to establish that the breath testing machine 
was functioning properly through expert testimony but does not speak to the issue 
of operator certification. Extending the rationale of Garcia to include operator 
certification circumvents the purpose of the Statute and RuJeaatt compromises the 
verification process to a point where evidence would no longer be reliable or 
trustworthy and exception to certification prone to exploitation. 
B. 
The trial court erred in finding that testimony of an officer regarding the 
operation of the Intoxilizer 5000 could still be admissible under the Rules of 
Evidence with proper foundation excluding the requirement of operator certification. 
Allowing testimony based on knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to 
render an opinion of the breath test results but not requiring certification as required 
by the legislative and administrative provisions undermines the essential regulatory 
scheme which has been accepted as the proper basis for establishing reliability and 
the basis upon which uniform standards and procedures have been established. The 
purpose has been one of efficiency, uniformity and consistency. There is a 
substantive due process and equal protection consideration to treat each defendant 
subject to testing with breath testing devices to be treated equally statewide and it 
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is not in the interest of the Public Safety Commissioner to have inherent deviation 
in test results from different standards or procedures from the various jurisdictions 
throughout the state. For testing to be reliable, the promulgated regulatory scheme 
for establishing reliability for admissibility in court must be strictly followed and 
where there is not indication that an intoxilizer test was performed according to the 
standards and procedures, the Appellant's motion to suppress should have been 
granted where it concerns operator certification and not a matter of the machine 
functioning properly as in State v. Garcia, to vitiate the statutory presumption. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS AFTER FINDING THAT THE STATE HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. SECTION 41-6-44.3 
AND RULE 714-500-6 OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
The trial court in its ruling of January 31st, 2003, denied Appellant's motion to 
suppress. However, the trial court also found that the State of Utah had not 
complied with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (1953, 
as amended) and Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) provides as follows: 
41-6-44.3 STANDARDS FOR CHEMICAL BREATH TEST -
EVIDENCE. 
(1) The Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall 
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establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical 
analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a 
person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the 
analysis was made and that the instrument was accurate, according to 
standards established in subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3). If the judge finds that the standards under section (1) and the 
conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there is presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary, (emphasis added). 
The Utah Administrative Code at Rule 714-500-6 constitutes part of the 
established standards for administration and interpretation of chemical analysis and 
provides as follows: 
R 714-500-6. Operator Certification 
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators" must be 
certified by the department. 
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by 
a program supervisor and/or technician. 
C. Initial Certification 
(1) in order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing 
instrument, an applicant must successfully complete a course of 
instruction approved by the department, which must include as a 
minimum the following: 
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath 
testing. 
c. On hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citations/D.UI. 
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Report forms. 
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of 
chemical testing, driving under the influence, case law and other 
alcohol related laws. 
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing 
simulated tests on the instruments, including demonstrations under the 
supervision of a class instructor. 
f. One hour for examination and critic of course. 
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a 
certificate will be issued that will be valid for two years. 
D. Renewal Certification 
(1) the operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration 
date. The minimum requirement for renewal of operator certification 
will be: 
a. To hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol on the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath 
testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citations/D.U.I. 
Report Form and Testimony of Arresting Officer. 
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and 
detecting the drinking driver. 
e. One hour of examination and critic of course. 
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the compact disk 
computer program including successful completion of exam. Result of 
exams must be forwarded to the program supervisor and a certification 
certificate will be issued. 
(2) Any operator who allows his certification to expire one year or 
longer must retake and successfully complete the initial certification 
course as outlined in paragraph C of this section, (emphasis added). 
As is evident from the details and specifics of the certification and 
recertification process, it was intended that the Commissioner of the Department of 
Public Safety initiate and conduct ongoing training significant and substantial to 
comply with the basic requirements of Section 44.3. That is, establish without 
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question the trustworthiness of the evidence to be relied upon. In addition, it may be 
inferred from the specifics of the Rule that it was the intention of the Commissioner 
of the Department of Public Safety to establish uniformity in the operations, practices 
and procedures for law enforcement and judicial personnel. In other words, as set 
forth in subsection three of Section 44.3, the judge or trier of fact may presume that 
the test results are valid without further foundation once the requirements are met. 
However, the circumstance before this Court is one that calls into question not only 
the issues of reliability and trustworthiness but a concern for maintaining uniform 
standards as a matter of operation, practice and procedure to insure that the 
certification process is not compromised. 
The trial court in the instant case has chosen to interpret the Statute and Rule 
as one that allows the court to simply strike the presumption raised had the test 
results proven to have been valid. It infers that there is presently no proscribed 
restriction and that reliability of the evidence may be established under Rule 702, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence pertains to testimony of 
experts and is verbatim from the Federal Rule and substantially the same as the 
former Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence prior to 1971. It is general and non-
specific and reads as follows: 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS. 
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will aid the trier of 
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fact in understanding the evidence or to determine a fact in issue a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
The trial court in its assessment of the circumstances concluded by stating as 
follows: 
Section 41-6-44.3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) only 
provides a method by which the State can create a presumption of 
validity of a chemical breath test analysis. It does not govern what is 
required to determine the admissibility of the evidence. Such breath 
test evidence will be allowed into evidence if the State can lay a proper 
foundation for the evidence, including evidence that the intoxilizer was 
properly functioning at the time of the test and that the officer 
possessed proper knowledge to operate the machine, that the officer 
correctly administered the test and that the test result is reliable. See 
the Record at page 83. 
In drawing such conclusion the trial court also stated that the admissibility of 
the intoxilizer test result will hinge on the ability of the State to qualify its officer as 
an expert witness2. In doing so the trial court presupposed that Rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence did not require that an expert be certified or licensed prior to being 
allowed to testify; certification, or the lack thereof, was determined to be a piece of 
evidence to be considered by the Court in deciding whether the State had 
established a proper foundation for the admission of the test result. There is no 
2
 This is the basis upon which the trial court would later establish as reliable for 
allowing admissibility of the breath test results. The fact that the officer had testified 
untruthfully under oath on a previous occasion does not appear to have been a factor 
or given much consideration in this instance. 
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question that the trial court in this case was keenly aware of the requirements of 
Rule 702. It is even probable to assume that it exercised caution in scrutinizing the 
qualifications of the officer and his proper administration of the test. However, the 
concern for allowing evidence of this nature to be admitted as an alternative basis 
for establishing reliability without an operator's certification through the established 
standards for administration calls in question the need for certification in the first 
instance. It challenges the fundamental premise of statutorily requiring the 
Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety to establish such standards and 
confounds the fundamental primary assumption upon which the Rule was 
promulgated, to insure the trustworthiness of the evidence in question. 
In State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah Court of Appeal 
addressed a similar issue in the context of Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative 
Code. In that case, the issue was one of calibration of the Intoxilizer 5000 
instrument, which is the same instrument used in the instant case. The testing officer 
recorded the results of the reference sample tests as "OK", indicating his opinion that 
the results were within an acceptable margin of error. However, he did not record 
the actual numerical results obtained. The Defendant moved to suppress the results 
of the breath test on the basis of due process violations and the State's violation of 
Utah Code. The Utah Administrative Code required that the results conducted on 
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the Intoxilizer 5000 series be recorded to at least three (3) decimal places. 
In that case, this Court found that the officer's improper recording was a 
violation of the Rule. This Court concluded in that case that if it was a violation of 
the procedures applicable to those referenced test samples, then "it is a violation 
that precludes the State from invoking the statutory presumption provided under 
Section 41-6-44.3. However, this conclusion did not require that evidence of 
Garcia's test result be excluded altogether despite Garcia's contention. Nothing in 
Section 41-6-44.3 precluded admission of other foundational evidence to establish 
the accuracy of the instrument at issue or of Garcia's particular test results. Rather, 
it merely defined those conditions under which a prosecutor may invoke a rebuttable 
presumption that breath test evidence were accurate and reliable. If these 
conditions were not met, the statutory presumption was not available. The statute 
reached no further. 
The most obvious distinction between State v. Garcia and the present case 
is whether the principle established there regarding the admission of other 
foundational evidence of the accuracy of the Intoxilizer 5000 should be extended to 
include issues of reliability contemplated by the certification process regulating the 
operating officer. The Appellant argues that such an extension invites unnecessary 
challenge to the certification process itself, directly affecting the operations, 
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practices and procedures for law enforcement and judicial personnel. In Garcia, this 
Court's reasoning is sound and not subject to exploitation. The error was one of 
implementation of data from which one assumes there was corroboration by 
evidence of other inducia of reliability that the machine functioned properly and that 
the error committed was one of human nature and not the disfunctioning of the 
machine itself. However, the fact that additional expert testimony might be needed 
to establish such reliability prevented its exploitation as an alternative means of 
admitting evidence without following the certification process provided under the 
Rule because it would not be cost effective to do so regularly. One of the very 
reasons for implementing the Statute and Rule was to avoid the cost of such expert 
testimony. Notwithstanding, it sets a different standard for law enforcement and 
judicial personnel to allow the establishment of admissibility of evidence by those 
not certified to perform the procedure. It is equivalent to allowing as a justifiable 
defense to the charge of driving without a license evidence that the driver was 
experienced, trained and otherwise qualified to operate a motor vehicle. 
The concern is more than an issue of admissibility under Rule 702, it creates 
an exception that circumvents the purpose of the Statute and Rule. It is contrary to 
the public policy purpose in establishing uniform standards throughout the State. 
Unlike the Garcia case, such an extension would be more susceptible to exploitation 
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since the more experience and training the officer acquired in the course of 
performing his duties, the less of a need he might justifiably feel to comply with the 
certification or recertification requirements of the Rule. Unlike Garcia, there is no 
financial disincentive to use expert testimony for purposes of admissibility when it 
is reasonable to assume that the very officer uncertified would be qualified as an 
expert as contemplated by the trial court judge in the instant case. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TESTIMONY OF AN OFFICER 
REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THE INTOXILIZER 5000 COULD STILL BE 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH PROPER 
FOUNDATION EXCLUDING THE REQUIREMENT OF OPERATOR 
CERTIFICATION. 
The Appellant contends that the circumstances in State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d 
508 (Ut. App. 1998), providing for some alternative means for admissibility of 
evidence to whether the Intoxilizer 5000 was functioning properly is an entirely 
different issue than the one in the instant case. To allow an uncertified operator of 
the machine testify as to its results solely upon his ability to qualify under Rule 702, 
Utah Rules of Evidence; namely, that because of his knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education is opening a flood gate and places as unessential the 
certification process, section 44.3 and R17-500-6 were originally promulgated to 
establish uniform standards of administration consistent and reliable from jurisdiction 
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to jurisdiction throughout the State. Either the provisions stand for uniformity and 
consistency or they serve no legitimate purpose as a means to establish trustworthy 
evidentiary procedure and the compelling interest justifying their enactment goes by 
the boards. Since the subject is one that often involves substantive due process and 
equal protection it is a matter that should be considered in the context of its impact 
upon future enforcement of the certification process. 
In Fuenning v. Arizona, 680 P.2d 121 (Ariz. 1983), the Arizona Supreme Court 
addressed a defendant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting results of the 
intoxilizer test over an objection of insufficient foundation due to the Tempe Police 
Department's failure to participate in a "quality assurance program" provided by the 
Department of Health Services. The Arizona Court found that the Rules promulgated 
by the Director and in effect at the time of the arrest were to promote the accuracy 
of test results of approved breath taking devices. Law enforcement agents 
conducting blood alcohol tests by means of direct breath testing devices were 
required to participate in a quality assurance program approved by the department. 
The operator was to utilize written procedures for performing tests and collecting 
samples in a determination of blood alcohol content. As in the instance case, the 
operator who administered the test in question was qualified but in this case held a 
valid permit. However, he had not participated in the quality assurance program or 
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made use of a DHS approved checklist. The State relied upon People v. Adams, 59 
Cal. App. 3d 559,131 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1976) which adopted a "goes to the weight not 
the admissibility" position. 
The Arizona Supreme Court, however, saw the matter differently and 
determined that the effect of noncompliance required the evidence to not be 
admitted. The Arizona Supreme Court went on to state that it believed that both 
sections must be read in pari materia. Any other result would mean that a chemical 
test could be admissible if it complied with the five (5) minimum standards contained 
in Section 28-692.03(a), but did not comply with the regulations which subsection B 
of the same statute requiring the Director of DHS. The Court found that possible 
result unacceptable. For purposes of the instant case, however, the purpose for 
which the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted the legislative goal is significant. The 
legislative goal was to establish a chemical standard which would be objective, 
uniform and applied on a statewide basis in order to keep intoxicated drivers off the 
road. Given the problems mentioned above there could be inherent deviation in test 
results if a particular test was performed in each jurisdiction with different standards 
and by different procedures for calibration, accuracy and quality controlled checks. 
Nothing would defeat the legislative objective more rapidly than to permit the various 
jurisdictions in Arizona to "go their own way" secure the knowledge that a test made 
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under their particular procedure would be admissible so long as they show the 
"accuracy and reliability" of their local methodology, notwithstanding that a different 
"accurate and reliable" procedure used in the adjoining town would have produced 
a different result in an otherwise identical situation. It is not within the legislative 
objective that a person be found guilty if apprehended in one area but innocent in 
another based upon varying standards, practices, operations or procedures. See 
Fuenninq at 133. 
The Arizona Supreme Court concludes by stating that the State failed to 
provide proper foundation for the admission for the chemical test and since there 
was no admissible evidence with regard to the blood alcohol level the Court should 
have granted Defendant's motion for acquittal. 
The same standard is presumed to apply in other forms of testing. For 
instance, in State v. Clark, 814 P.2d 222 (Wash. App. 1991), the testing was in the 
form of a blood alcohol test where in the context of the preservation of the blood 
sample, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that before blood alcohol test 
results could be admitted into evidence, the State must present prima facia proof 
that the test chemicals and the blood samples are free from any adulteration which 
could conceivably introduce error to the test results. While the scientific prospects 
of preserving such a sample may invoke a whole different range of considerations, 
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the standard is still the same. That is, the State must provide a result which is free 
from any conceivable error to be reliable. That is not a standard to comply with 
substantially but strictly in every case. Otherwise the process is unreliable. 
The Appellant believes that this Court has applied the same standard in 
Williams v. 6, 740 P.2d 1354 (Ut. App.) where the Utah Court of Appeals addressed 
the standard set in Murry City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) and stated that the 
accuracy of the breathalizer test depends on the proper functioning of the machine 
and the proper compounding of chemicals in the ampuls. The Court concluded that 
in place of the officer's testimony, affidavits may be submitted regarding 
maintenance of a specific breathalizer as admissible evidence of the proper 
functioning of the machine. However, the Court found the affidavits in question failed 
to satisfy the requirements because they did not attest from personal knowledge. 
Where there is no indication that the intoxilizer test was performed in accordance 
with the standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety, the arresting 
officer's statement that there was "no problem" with the equipment was insufficient. 
The Utah Court of Appeals saw fit not to apply the public records exception of the 
hearsay Rule, the Utah Rulesof Evidence 803(a) nor the trustworthy exception in 
part C of that Rule. This Court noted that the record was void of any evidence that 
the intoxilizer was properly tested and performed according to the standards set by 
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the Commissioner of Public Safety. In other words, the standard of admissibility was 
that set by the Statute and Rule by the Commission of Public Safety and not as what 
otherwise might have been admissible under the general rules of evidence. 
In addition, from a clearly practical stand point there is concern about the 
impact a decision supporting alternative qualification would have upon the 
certification process. Because the standard is more general and less specific under 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, it is not unreasonable to assume that any officer 
administering an Intoxilizer 5000 test which is not certified would likely be qualified 
as an expert be reason of his training, experience and knowledge. If law 
enforcement is allowed to proceed on that basis, it is not unreasonable to assume 
it will no longer be perceived necessary to continue recertifying. If there was a 
situation in where the exception swallowed the rule, this is certainly one that fits the 
description. 
In Kansas, the Supreme Court in State v. Bishop, 957 P.2d 369 (Kansas 1998) 
saw the need for certification as fundamental to its similar statutory scheme. In 
pertinent part it states: 
To create an evidentiary foundation for a breath test, the State must 
introduce evidence into trial that the testing equipment was certified by 
the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), that the 
testing procedures were used in accordance with the manufacturer's 
operational manual and the requirements set out by the KDHE, and that 
the person who operated the testing equipment was certified by the 
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KDHE to operate such equipment, (emphasis added). 
The Kansas Supreme Court went on to state that the legislature had expressly found 
that, for breath test results to be reliable, the testing equipment, the testing 
procedures, and the operator of the equipment must all be certified. Id. at 375. In 
that case, the court found the evidence to be reliable where the testing procedures 
were certified but not with the original certification documentation as photostatic 
copies had been reproduced and admitted into evidence in all proceedings, see also 
Harry v. Schwendiman, 70 P.2d 1344 (Ut. App. 1987). The Appellant contends that 
it makes good sense to allow for alternative methods for validating reliable test 
results regarding the operation and function of the testing machine, the Intoxilizer 
5000, but the considerations for operator certification are much more significant from 
a public policy standpoint disallowing such a practice. Therefore, it is the 
Defendant's position that the trial court's application of the reasoning in Garcia was 
misapplied and in error in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests 
judgment in his favor as the Court deems appropriate together with such and further 
relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
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